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Abstract
We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the
preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asym-
metric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which ratio-
nalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common
agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of dif-
ferentiable equilibria which are ex post ineﬃcient and exhibit free-riding. We
then characterize some interim eﬃcient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a
unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This
focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types.
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11 Introduction
Over the past twenty years and following the seminal contributions of Wilson (1979)
and Bernheim and Whinston (1986a), the common agency literature has developed an
analytical framework to tackle a variety of important problems such as menu auctions,1
public good provisions through voluntary contributions,2 or policy formation under the
inﬂuence of competing lobbying groups.3 Given this broad range of applications, it is fair
to say that the common agency model is by now viewed as a major piece of the toolkit of
many economists, most noticeably within the ﬁeld of political economy.
In our view, the tremendous success of the model relies both on the clear and simple
underlying assumptions on which it is based but also on the very precise predictions it
conveys. Common agency models are based on the fact that several principals design
non-cooperatively contribution schedules ti(q) for a common agent. This common agent
in turn decides of the quantity q of public good on behalf of his principals. Players’
preferences are common knowledge and risk-neutrality is generally assumed. A priori,
many equilibria of this two-stage game can emerge thanks to the freedom in specifying how
contributions are designed oﬀ the equilibrium; some being possibly ineﬃcient. The out of
equilibrium behavior speciﬁed by each principal in the schedule he oﬀers to the common
agent acts as a threat to prevent deviations away from a particular equilibrium outcome.
By imposing that contributions are truthful, i.e., reﬂect the relative preferences of the
principals among alternatives, Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) were able to signiﬁcantly
reduce this indeterminacy and to select equilibria which are essentially unique in terms of
the level of public good provided.4 Truthfulness has an important consequence in terms of
the eﬃciency of the equilibrium allocation. Since a principal’s marginal preferences among
alternatives are fully reﬂected by his contribution, what this principal pays at the margin
for inducing a change in the agent’s decision is exactly what it is worth to him. Modulo
the truthfulness reﬁnement, common agency games provide an eﬃcient way of aggregating
preferences in a world of complete information. The level of public good chosen out of
the multilateral contractual process necessarily maximizes the aggregate payoﬀ of the
grand-coalition made of the contributing principals and their common agent.
The goal of this paper is to start extending the common agency literature to the case
where principals have private information on their preferences for the public good. Clearly,
this extension is necessary in a variety of circumstances. Voluntary contributions to a
1Wilson (1979), Bernheim and Whinston (1986a), Anton and Yao (1989 and 1992).
2Laussel and Lebreton (1998 and 2001).
3Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), among many others.
4Multiplicity comes only from the possible ﬂexibility in sharing the aggregate surplus among the
contributing principals and their common agent. The feasible redistributions of the aggregate surplus
can be fully described by means of a set of simple inequalities. See Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) and
Laussel and Lebreton (2001).
2public good are designed by donors with an eye on the information they convey on their
willingness to pay. In the political arena, lobbying groups have private information on the
beneﬁts they withdraw from a given policy and much of their activity consists in conveying
information to a less-well informed policy-maker.5 Introducing asymmetric information on
the principals’ preferences imposes incentive compatibility constraints which replace and
give ﬁrmer foundations to the truthfulness requirement imposed so far in the complete
information literature.
One could a priori conjecture that this minor perturbation of the standard model
would not modify its main insights. This is not true. Far from ensuring uniqueness of the
equilibrium allocation and by contrast with truthfulness, incentive compatibility intro-
duces a new reason for the multiplicity of equilibria. In a Bayesian setting, the strategy
of each principal depends on his type and, at a best response, a given principal forms
a conjecture on how the marginal contributions of others evolve with their own types.
This ﬂexibility leads to multiple equilibria. In a context with two symmetric principals,
the set of symmetric equilibria is really largee in the following sense: starting from any
monotonically increasing equilibrium level of public good below the ﬁrst-best along the 45
degree line where principals have the same willingness to pay (with no distortion at the
top), we can reconstruct the whole marginal contributions and equilibrium output oﬀ this
ray to complete the description of a symmetric diﬀerentiable equilibrium of the common
agency game.
To better understand this multiplicity, it is necessary to describe the behavior of each
principal. When choosing how much to contribute at the margin for q units of the public
good, each principal behaves as a monopsonist in front of a residual supply curve. This
residual supply curve is obtained by substracting the expected marginal contributions
of other principals from the common agent’s marginal cost function of producing the
public good. This principal chooses thus to increase his marginal contribution for q
units up to the point where the marginal beneﬁt he withdraws from all the inframarginal
units produced at that price is just equal to the added supply that such an increase in
contribution induces. When other principals contribute on average less at the margin, the
residual supply is shifted downwards and, at a best response, a given principal chooses
also to contribute less at the margin. This creates some form of complementarity among
the principals which generates multiple equilibria.
5In this respect, it is striking to see that Grossman and Helpman themselves have stressed this point
in their recent book (Grossman and Helpman (2001, Chapter 4)). The diﬃculty in extending their basic
model of common agency with monetary contributions to a framework with asymmetric information led
them to give up any monetary exchanges between principals (lobbying groups) and their common agent
(the policy-maker) and to develop alternative models of cheap-talk à la Crawford and Sobel (1982). Our
paper can be viewed as making a ﬁrst step towards a more synthetic treatment with both monetary
transfers and asymmetric information on the preferences of the lobbyists.
3Given that particularly severe multiplicity problem, we ﬁrst follow the tradition of
the common agency literature under complete information in looking for equilibrium al-
locations which also satisfy some eﬃciency property. Ex post eﬃciency is by far too
demanding concept. All equilibria are ex post ineﬃcient. Downward distortions below
the ﬁrst-best come from the existing free-riding between principals who contribute less at
the margin than what the good is worth to them.
The eﬃciency criterion must be relaxed and we turn to the weaker concept of interim
eﬃciency.6 An equilibrium may be interim eﬃcient under speciﬁc assumptions on the
principals’ distribution of types. Nevertheless, not all equilibria of the common agency
game are interim eﬃcient. Common agency games are in fact less eﬃcient ways of commu-
nicating information than a centralized mechanism organized by an uninformed mediator
as usually postulated to ﬁnd interim eﬃcient allocations.7 Those allocations result in-
stead from the interaction between decentralized mechanisms oﬀered by non-cooperating
principals. Interim eﬃcient equilibria may nevertheless sometimes exist, in which case
they can be characterized in terms of the social weights given to the diﬀerent principals’
types in the welfare function that would be maximized by the mediator.8
We then turn to another selection device: robustness to random perturbations. We
introduce a non-observable shock on the common agent’s preferences. An equilibrium
nonlinear schedule must go through all quantities corresponding to various realizations
of that shock. This robustness requirement severely constrains nonlinear contributions
at equilibrium. This criterion pins down a one-dimensional family of equilibria, reduc-
ing thereby the multiplicity problem by a tall order. Moreover, these focal solutions are
Pareto-ranked. The Pareto-dominating robust equilibrium is solution to a ﬁrst order par-
tial derivative equation (PDE) involving the partial derivatives of the equilibrium output
with respect to types and to the random shock. That PDE can be solved explicitly for
any type distribution and agent’s cost function. Looking at the trace of the characteristic
surface on the hyperplane corresponding to a null shock yields ﬁnally a unique equilibrium
output for a model without shock.
Finally, our last contribution consists in proposing a mechanism design approach useful
to ﬁnd the subclass of so-called pointwise optimal equilibria of our common agency game.
This approach helps understanding how each principal designs his contribution not only
to convey information to the common agent on his own preferences but also to extract the
information that this agent may learn on other principals when observing their mere oﬀers.
This double-sided role of a contribution in a common agency environment points at the
6See Holmström and Myerson (1983).
7Note that this mediator could be the uninformed agent himself.
8For instance, when principals’ types are independently and uniformly distributed, all types receive
the same weight of one half in this social welfare function in one particular interim eﬃcient equilibrium
of the common agency game.
4fact that “market information”9 has to be learned in equilibrium. Of course, the diﬃculty
is that “market information” is by large endogenous: this is what other principals are
revealing to the common agent in an equilibrium. Standard mechanism design techniques
can still be used to compute those common agency equilibria.
Review of the literature: The results of the common agency literature developed
in complete information environments have been viewed as so attractive that they were
extended in many diﬀerent directions. Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) have relaxed
the assumption of quasi-linear preferences made in Berheim and Whinston (1986a) to
introduce redistributive concerns which may be quite relevant for political economy ap-
plications. Laussel and Lebreton (2001) have introduced uncertainty on the preferences of
the common agent.Given that contribution schedules are oﬀered at the ex ante stage, i.e.,
before principals and the agent learn the realization of the preference parameter, eﬃciency
is preserved. Prat and Rustichini (2003) have allowed competition among principals try-
ing to inﬂuence multiple agents. Finally, Bergemann and Välimäki (2003) consider the
dynamics of common agency games. The main features of the solution remain.
Paralleling that part of the literature which does not stress at all any incentive prob-
lems, other authors have looked at the oligopolistic screening environments where diﬀerent
principals try to elicit a piece of information which is privately known by the common
agent at the contracting stage. Stole (1991), Martimort (1992, 1996), Biais, Martimort
and Rochet (2000) and Martimort and Stole (2002, 2003) among others have analyzed
such models. The focus of these papers is on the ineﬃciency introduced by the lack of
coordination under oligopolistic screening and its impact on the distribution of the agent’s
information rent. Our focus is instead on asymmetric information on the principals’ side.
The contract oﬀered by a given principal has not only to signal his type to the common
agent but also to screen the endogenous information that the latter learns, in equilibrium,
on other principals’ preferences.
Our paper is also linked to the literature on voluntary contributions, most noticeably
those papers which assume private information on the contributors’ side. Menezes, Mon-
teiro and Temini (2001) and Laussel and Palfrey (2003) have both analyzed such games
when the public good is a 0-1 decision and contributors have private information on their
willingness to pay. Even though both papers stress the multiplicity of equilibria that
arises in those environments, they do so only in a framework with a discrete 0-1 decision.
Menezes, Monteiro and Temini (2001) highlight the strong ex post ineﬃciency of equilibria
of the contribution game. Laussel and Palfrey (2003) are instead interested in the interim
eﬃciency of some equilibrium allocations. We also derive simple Lindahl-Samuelson con-
9Borrowing an expression due to Epstein and Peters (1999) and Peters (2001). Those papers derive
Revelation Principles for multiprincipal environments where principals’ preferences are common knowl-
edge. Market information may then capture the endogenous randomness of mixed-strategy equilibria.
5ditions characterizing the provision of a continuous public good and show that downward
distortions below the ﬁrst-best exist in any equilibrium satisfying a simple monotonicity
condition. Working with a continuous level of public good yields also a more tractable
way of getting interim eﬃcient equilibrium outcomes than in Laussel and Palfrey (2003).
Our techniques of selecting among Bayesian-Nash equilibrium allocations as being
robust to perturbations of the game is clearly reminiscent of Klemperer and Meyer (1989)’s
device for selecting among Nash equilibria in supply functions equilibria. Although similar
in spirit, our approach diﬀers since it applies to a Bayesian setting and yields a closed
form expression of the equilibrium allocation for any type distribution and cost function.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibria of our common
agency game under asymmetric information. We give a special attention to what we call
pointwise optimal equilibria. We derive the Lindahl-Samuelson conditions in our frame-
work and give a few properties of the equilibrium nonlinear contributions and equilibria,
noticeably ex post ineﬃciency. Section 4 is devoted to the multiplicity problem. Section
5 focuses on interim eﬃciency. Section 6 introduces random perturbations to select a
unique equilibrium allocation which is characterized. Section 7 reinterprets the pointwise
optimal equilibria using a mechanism design approach. Section 8 brieﬂy concludes. Proofs
are relegated to an Appendix. For completeness, we show there also how to construct
non-diﬀerentiable equilibria which are ineﬃcient.
2 The Model
There are two risk-neutral principals Pi (i = 1,2) who derive utility from consuming a
public good which is produced in non-negative quantity q.10 This public good may be an
infrastructure of variable size, a charitable activity, or it may also have a more abstract
interpretation as a policy variable in a lobbying game.
Principal i gets a utility Vi = θiv(q)−ti from consuming q units of the good where v( )
is twice diﬀerentiable, increasing and strictly concave and ti is the corresponding payment.
With a convenient renormalization of utils we set v(q) ≡ q and adopt this formulation for
simplicity.11
Contributions are collected by a common agent A who produces at cost C(q) the
public good. The function C( ) is twice diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave. To avoid
unnecessary technicalities due to corner conditions, the Inada condition C′(0) = 0 hold
except when stated explicitly.
10Extension to the case of n > 2 principals increases signiﬁcantly complexity.
11This formulation is also convenient to interpret q in [0,1] as the probability of producing the public
good in the case of a discrete 0-1 project which costs nothing if not undertaken.
6Principals are privately informed on their respective valuations θi. Those types are
independently drawn from the same common knowledge and atomless distribution on
Θ = [θ,  θ] with c.d.f. F( ) and everywhere positive density f = F ′ except, when needed,
at   θ but then this extra assumption is made explicit.
The common agency game between principals unfolds as follows. First, principals learn
their preferences. Second, they oﬀer non-cooperatively contribution schedules {ti(q,ˆ θi)}ˆ θi∈Θ
to the agent. Third, the agent accepts or refuses all those contracts at once. If he refuses,
the game ends. Upon acceptance, the agent chooses to produce an amount of public good.
Corresponding payments are then made.
We will be interested in characterizing various classes of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
(PBE) - or equilibria in short - of this game.
Even though the contexts are of course quite diﬀerent, we follow the same strategy as
when computing the equilibrium of a ﬁrst-price auction to characterize equilibria of the
game. Facing the menu of bidding contributions {ti(q,ˆ θi)}ˆ θi∈Θ, principal Pi with type θi
picks whatever schedule he prefers. By the Revelation Principle applied to that Bayesian
game, there is no loss of generality in restricting the menus to be incentive compatible.12
Each principal Pi picks then the contribution corresponding to his own type. This leads
us to state the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 : A family of nonlinear schedules {ti(q,ˆ θi)}ˆ θi∈Θ is incentive compatible
if and only if principal Pi ﬁnds it optimal to truthfully reveal his type at a Bayesian
equilibrium of the contribution game.
It is important to stress the diﬀerence between incentive compatibility and the notion
of truthfulness developed in Bernheim and Whinston (1986a). In that latter piece, the
principals’ preferences are common knowledge and truthfulness simply means that the
marginal contribution of each principal is equal to his marginal valuation for the good.
In other words, and when q takes values in a continuum, “truthfulness” means that
∂ti
∂q (q,ˆ θi) = ˆ θi for all ˆ θi and all q. Under asymmetric information instead, incentive
compatibility requires only that each principal ﬁnds optimal to report truthfully his type
by choosing the right contribution knowing that at the second stage, the agent chooses
how much to produce.
A diﬀerentiable menu is a menu of incentive compatible nonlinear prices which are
three times piece-wise diﬀerentiable with respect to q and ˆ θi.13
12Or truthful in the sense of incentive theory, not in the sense of the complete information common
agency literature.
13In the Appendix, we analyze a class of non-diﬀerentiable equilibria.
7Remark 1: Our speciﬁcation of the bidding game and the contribution schedules available
to each principal seems to restrict a priori the strategy space of the principals. It seems
to preclude that any principal deviates by oﬀering a more complex mechanism if he wants
so. Section 7 precisely shows that the equilibria we obtain are robust. They are also
equilibria when principals can deviate by oﬀering more complex mechanisms belonging to
a larger strategy space.
Remark 2: We model here a game of intrinsic common agency14 such that all contri-
butions are accepted or refused at once. Following Bernheim and Whinston (1986a), the
common agency literature has mostly studied models of delegated common agency where
the agent may choose to turn down one of the oﬀers. Of course, this extra option somewhat
restricts the distribution of the aggregate surplus between the contributing principals and
the agent. Because of complete information, those redistributive issues have nevertheless
no impact on the actual decision that the agent takes. Instead, we put here at the core
of the analysis asymmetric information which already links redistributive concerns and
eﬃciency through incentive constraints. In our view, giving up the more complex model
of delegated common agency in a ﬁrst step is, in a sense, less of an issue in this context.
Benchmark: For further references, we denote by q∗(θ1,θ2) the ﬁrst-best level of public








Note that q∗( ) is (strictly) monotonically increasing in each of its arguments.
3 Preliminary Results
In this section, we are interested in characterizing the truthful menus {t(q,ˆ θ)}ˆ θ∈Θ oﬀered
at a symmetric equilibrium of the contribution game and we thus omit the index i. For
ease of notation, let us denote p(q,θi) = ∂
∂qt(q,θi) the marginal contribution of a principal
with type θi when q units of public good are produced.






14See Bernheim and Whinston (1986b) who coined this term.











′′(q(θ1,θ2)) ≤ 0. (3)
We will ﬁrst omit this last constraint in our analysis and will check ex post that it is
satisﬁed at equilibrium.
Of particular relevance are contribution schedules such that upward shifts in the prin-
cipal’s valuation (weakly) increase the equilibrium quantity. Using (2) and a revealed
preference argument, this is of course obtained when
∂p
∂θi(q,θi) ≥ 0 for all (q,θi). Such
equilibrium schedules exhibit thus the same Spence-Mirrlees property (SMP) than the
principals’ preferences.




(q,θi) ≥ 0 for all (q,θi).
For such a schedule, a standard revealed preference argument yields:
Lemma 1 : In any PBE of the contribution game with contribution schedules satisfying
SMP:
• q(θi,θ−i) is almost everywhere diﬀerentiable,
•
∂q
∂θi(θi,θ−i) ≥ 0, for all (θi,θ−i) in Θ2.
Given the outcome of that last stage of the game, the Revelation Principle applies at




where Φ(ˆ θi,θi) = E
￿
θiq(ˆ θi, ) − t(q(ˆ θi, ),ˆ θi)
￿
is principal Pi’s payoﬀ when his type is θi
and he picks the contribution corresponding to type ˆ θi within the proposed menu. E[ ] is
the expectation operator with respect to the distribution F.
9Integrating by parts yields:
E
￿
t(q(ˆ θi, ),ˆ θi)
￿
= (F( ) − 1)t(q(ˆ θi, ),ˆ θi)





1 − F( )
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= t(q(ˆ θi,θ),ˆ θi) + E
￿










Inserting into the maximand of (4) gives us ﬁnally:
Φ(ˆ θi,θi) = E
￿￿
θiq(ˆ θi, ) −












Proposition 1 : The ﬁrst- and second-order conditions for optimality of the principal’s







θi + p−i(q(θi, ), ) − C
′(q(θi, )) −














for all θi in Θ and i = 1,2.
Pointwise-optimality: Among the equilibrium schedules satisfying conditions (6) and
(7), we focus on those which are pointwise optimal and monotonic in the sense that:










(θi,θ−i) ≥ 0 (9)
for all (θi,θ−i) in Θ2 , i = 1,2.
This focus on pointwise optimality will be motivated later on in Section 7 when we
turn to one particular implementation of the PBE just described. From now on, the
deﬁnition of an equilibrium will implicitly include that pointwise optimality requirement.
The following lemma guarantees that every proﬁle of public good and marginal con-
tribution which satisfy (8) and (9), satisfy also the conditions for global optimality.
Lemma 2 : Let {q(θ1,θ2),p(q,θ)} be a pair of public good level and marginal contribu-
tion schedule satisfying (8) and (9). This proﬁle, if it exists, constitutes a PBE of the
contribution game.
10Condition (8) has an intuitive meaning. It looks like the traditional optimality con-
dition for a simple problem involving principal Pi and an agent with preferences t +
t−i(q,θ−i) − C(q) who has private information on θ−i. The right-hand side of (8) repre-
sents then the standard distortion due to the fact that, under asymmetric information,
this is the virtual demand of the agent which should be taken into account at the time
of ﬁnding Pi’s best-response. We will come back on that later in Section 7 where this
analogy becomes highlighting.
Modiﬁed Lindahl-Samuelson conditions: Condition (8) is also helpful in already
deriving a few properties of the equilibrium schedules. To do so, let us focus on strictly
increasing output schedules such that (9) is strict over the range of q( ). We can thus
uniquely deﬁne the inverse function ψ(q,θi) as q(θi,ψ(q,θi)) = q for all θi and q in the
range of q(θi, ). Note that because q is in the range of q(θi, ), ψ(q,θi) belongs to [θ,  θ].
Condition (8) becomes thus:







for all q in the range of q(θi, ). This can be rewritten as:
∂
∂θi
[p(q,θi)(1 − F(θi))] = (ψ(q,θi) − C
′(q))f(θi)








￿   θ
θi
ψ(q,x)f(x)dx, (11)
where ϕ(q) is an integration constant.
If we impose that
∂p
∂θi(q,θi) is bounded around θi =   θ, we must have ϕ(q) = 0. Finally,





￿   θ
θi
ψ(q,x)f(x)dx. (12)
Taking into account that
p(q,θi) + p(q,ψ(q,θi)) = C
′(q) (13)




￿   θ
θi
ψ(q,x)f(x)dx,




￿   θ
ψ(q,θi)
ψ(q,x)f(x)dx. (14)
11By summing the expressions of the marginal contributions obtained from (14), we get







￿   θ
θi
ψ(q(θ1,θ2),x)f(x)dx. (15)
To understand (15), it is useful to come back on the deﬁnition of the equilibrium
schedule given in (14). Given the equilibrium conjecture p( ), one may deﬁne for any type
θi and output q, the conjugate type ψ(q,θi) which is such that the quantity q is produced
when both types follow the equilibrium strategy. All types corresponding to a valuation
x greater than ψ(q,θi) are thus ready to contribute at the margin at least p(q,ψ(q,θi))
for q units of public good in any SMP equilibrium. This is in front of those types that
principal Pi with type θi can in fact underestimate his valuation and contribute less than
his true willingness to pay for q units of the good. How much can he underestimate his
valuation? Indeed, facing such a type x, the marginal contribution of principal Pi with
conjugate type ψ(q,x) is p(q,ψ(q,x)). Once q units of the good are produced with type
x for principal P−i, one can infer that the marginal valuation of principal Pi is at least
ψ(q,x). What (14) shows is that the marginal contribution of type θi is an average of
all such inframarginal valuations. Since x is greater than θi, and ψ(q, ) is decreasing in
its second argument, that average is lower than θi. This already shows the extent of the
principals’ bid-shading in this game.
Ex post ineﬃciency: Integrating by parts (16), we obtain:
p(q,θi) = θi +
1
1 − F(ψ(q,θi))




(q,x)(1 − F(x))dx. (16)









when output is monotonically increasing. Therefore, in any symmetric PBE of the contri-
bution game satisfying SMP (if such an equilibrium exists) and corresponding to a strictly
monotonic output and nonlinear schedules having bounded derivative
∂p
∂θ( ) around   θ, the
equilibrium schedule t(q,θi) does not reﬂect the preferences of the principal with types
θi. This ﬁnding contrasts sharply with the ﬁndings of Bernheim and Whinston (1986a)
who show that, under complete information, equilibrium schedules can be chosen so that
they reﬂect the principal’s preferences. Under asymmetric information instead, those
preferences are not reﬂected at equilibrium.
Proposition 2 : In any equilibrium satisfying SMP, we have:
p(q,θ) ≤ θ, (17)
12for all θ in [θ,  θ], with a strict inequality everywhere except at θ =   θ and for q = q∗(  θ,  θ).
The Lindahl-Samuelson conditions (15) imply that equilibrium outputs are downward
distorted below the ﬁrst-best. This phenomenon is nothing else than the usual “free-
rider” problem for public good. Instead of being cast in a centralized Bayesian mechanism
as in the framework of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), free-riding appears now at the
symmetric equilibrium of a game with voluntary contributions. Principals shade their
valuations and their marginal contributions to the public good are less than what it is
worth to each of them. As a result of this phenomenon, there is underprovision of the
public good.
Corollary 1 : An ex post eﬃcient outcome can never be implemented at a SMP equi-
librium of the common agency game. Downward distortions below the ﬁrst-best always
occur.
Remark 3: It is worth noticing that, under complete information, free-riding does not
occur in the Bernheim and Whinston (1986a)’s framework since the public good level is
eﬃcient when schedules are truthful. If one is interested in the normative properties of
the equilibria (if any), one needs to relax the eﬃciency concept. This is what will be done
in the Section 5.
4 Equilibrium Existence and Multiplicity
The qualitative properties of equilibria derived above do not give us much information
on their existence and multiplicity. After all, the Lindahl-Samuelson rule (15) is rather
complex and only deﬁnes q( ) implicitly in terms of its inverse functions ψ(q, ) which is a
quite unusual feature.
Constructing equilibria: To get further insights on the existence and multiplicity of
SMP equilibria, it is useful to come back on the two conditions which deﬁne the mar-
ginal contribution p(q, ) and the conjugate type ψ(q, ) and to reconstruct from there an
equilibrium:
p(q,θ) + p(q,ψ(q,θ)) = C
′(q), (18)






for all (q,θ), where q is in the range of q( ), the equilibrium schedule of outputs.
In fact, those two equations do not yet uniquely deﬁne an equilibrium marginal sched-
ule. We need ﬁrst to deﬁne which type ˜ θ is such that q(˜ θ,˜ θ) = q in the equilibrium under
13scrutiny. When both principals have type ˜ θ, their marginal contributions are the same.





Moreover, by deﬁnition of a conjugate type, it must be that:
ψ(q,ψ(q,θ)) = θ, (21)
for all θ in [θ,  θ] and q in the range of q( ).
The particular role played by the 45 degree line θ1 = θ2 in deﬁning the “initial con-
ditions” of the system (18)-(19) shows already that there exists a ﬁrst degree of freedom
in deﬁning an equilibrium. The same quantity q can a priori be given to two diﬀerent
types ˜ θ in two diﬀerent equilibria. A second degree of freedom comes from the ﬂexibility
in deﬁning the function ψ(q,θ). Any function ψ(q,θ) is its own conjugate as soon as its
graph is symmetric with respect to the 45 degree line.
Instead of deﬁning the equilibrium output q( ), we may describe as well an equilibrium





∂θ2(θ1,θ2) > 0 are then satisﬁed whenever
∂ψ
∂θ
(q,θ) < 0 and
∂ψ
∂q
(q,θ) > 0 (22)
over the whole domain of deﬁnition of ψ( ).
This approach in terms of isoquants is used thereafter to characterize the equilibrium
schedules because it illuminates the two degrees of freedom left in specifying both the
equilibrium output Q(θ) = q(θ,θ) along the 45 degree line and the conjugate type. Once
we deﬁne a function ψ(q,θ) satisfying (21) over [θ,˜ θ] and the monotonically increasing
output along the 45 degree line Q(θ), we can reconstruct the marginal contribution p(q,θ)
on [θ,˜ θ] using (19) and thus on the whole interval [θ,  θ] using (18). This procedure is made
explicit in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 : Fix any monotonically increasing output schedule Q(θ) = q(θ,θ) such
that Q(θ) ≤ q∗(θ,θ) (with an equality only at   θ) and ﬁx a function ψ(q,θ) such that:
• conditions (21) and (22) hold,
• ψ(q,˜ θ) = ˜ θ for some ˜ θ such that Q(˜ θ) = q.
Provided that the second-order condition for the agent’s problem (3) is satisﬁed, there
exists a unique marginal contribution p(q,θ) that generates isoquants having equation θ2 =









over [θ,˜ θ] with the boundary condition (20). The marginal contribution over the interval
[˜ θ,  θ] is deﬁned by
p(q,θ) = C
′(q) − p(q,ψ(q,θ)) (24)
where ψ(q,θ) belongs to [θ,˜ θ].
It is by now in the Folklore of the profession to justify focusing on nonlinear contri-
butions in models of incomplete information because those nonlinearities are needed to
convey information or screen preferences in a world where preferences are not common
knowledge. When the concept of “truthfulness” is given a more precise meaning by ex-
plicitly introducing an information problem, we obtain a rather disappointing result: still
a large set of equilibria survives.
To better understand this multiplicity, it is necessary to describe the behavior of
each principal at an equilibrium of the contribution game. When choosing how much
to contribute at the margin for q units of the public good, each principal behaves as a
monopsonist in front of a residual supply curve. This residual supply curve is obtained by
substracting the expected marginal contributions of the other principal from the common
agent’s marginal cost function. This principal chooses thus to increase his marginal con-
tribution for q units up to the point where the marginal beneﬁt he withdraws from all the
inframarginal units produced at that price is just equal to the increase in the supply of the
good that such an increased contribution induces. When the other principal contributes
at the margin on average less, the residual supply is shifted downwards and, at a best
response, a given principal chooses also to contribute less at the margin. This creates
some form of complementarity between principals and generates multiple equilibria.
Remark 4: When an isoquant ψ(q,θ) is deﬁned over [θ,˜ θ] it must be, by deﬁnition, that
ψ(q,θ) ≤   θ. Reciprocally, when ψ(q,θ) is only deﬁned over an interval [θ1,˜ θ] with θ1 > θ,
we have ψ(q,θ1) =   θ. In other words, q does not belong to the range of the equilibrium
schedule q(θ, ) for θ < θ1.
Remark 5: The resolution techniques and the multiplicity of equilibria found above are
reminiscent of the analysis of equilibria in double auctions made in Leininger, Linhart
and Radner (1989). Those authors have developed a procedure that consists in ﬁxing
the equilibrium strategies for the buyer and the seller when their valuations coincide and
reconstruct numerically the bidding strategies as solutions of diﬀerential equations with
15lags on both sides of these critical values. Menezes, Monteiro and Temini (2001) and
Laussel and Palfrey (2003, p. 460) use also a similar technique in their public good model
with a 0-1 decision. The ﬂexibility in choosing the equilibrium quantities in a continuum
allows us to solve explicitly a similar diﬀerential equation for the marginal contributions as
a function of a ψ(q,θ) function which represents a degree of freedom. Menezes, Monteiro
and Temini (2001) argue that one should be careful in checking for the monotonicity
conditions of the equilibrium schedule. Our approach avoids this problem. We start from
specifying a ψ(q,θ) which satisﬁes those monotonicity conditions and then reconstruct
equilibrium strategies.
Multiplicity revisited: To sharpen intuition for why multiple equilibria are possible,
it is useful to give an alternative expression of the Lindahl-Samuelson conditions. This
expression is obtained by summing up the conditions of pointwise optimality for both





















































This expression illuminates also the degree of freedom available to describe equilibria.




∂q(q(θ1,θ2),θi) − C′′(q(θ1,θ2)) which
is the second derivative of the agent’s objective function evaluated at the equilibrium
quantities. That term plays the role of a conjecture that, when it varies, allows to trace
out the diﬀerent equilibrium quantities. The purpose of the next two sections is precisely
to pin down this conjecture by imposing various requirements (either interim eﬃciency or
robustness to perturbations).
For the time being, this expression allows us to get:
Corollary 2 : At a SMP equilibrium characaterized in Proposition 3, the local second-






′′(q(θ1,θ2)) ≤ 0 for all (θ1,θ2) in Θ2. (27)
165 Interim Eﬃciency
Under complete information, Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) have observed that the
“truthful” equilibrium of common agency game lies on the Pareto-frontier of what the
contributing principals could achieve by binding themselves through a contract. Under
asymmetric information, one can still be interested by the normative properties of equilib-
ria provided Pareto eﬃciency is replaced by interim eﬃciency to take into account asym-
metric information. Following Laussel and Palfrey (2003), we investigate under which
circumstances an equilibrium of our common agency game under asymmetric information
is interim eﬃcient.
We ﬁrst describe interim eﬃcient allocations. Those allocations are obtained as the
solution of a centralized mechanism design problem where an uninformed mediator (pos-
sibly the agent) oﬀers a single mechanism to both principals, who then report their types
to this mediator. This mediator maximizes a weighted sum of both the principals and the
agent’s utilities with the weights given to diﬀerent types of the principals being possibly
diﬀerent. For simplicity, we restrict to symmetric allocations so that the weights do not
depend on the principal’s identity.
Proposition 4 : (Ledyard and Palfrey (1999)) A level of public good q(θ1,θ2) is interim
eﬃcient if and only if there exists positive social weights α(θ) such that:
￿   θ
θ







b(θi) = θi −
1 − F(θi)
f(θi)
(1 − ˜ α(θi))




￿   θ
θi
α(x)f(x)dx.
This formula is valid as long as the right-hand side of (29) is monotonically increasing in
each θi for i = 1,2.
The fact that
￿   θ
θ α(x)f(x)dx < 1 captures the possibility that a positive social weight
is given to the common agent in the social welfare function maximized by the uninformed
mediator.
17As a preliminary remark, notice that an interim eﬃcient allocation is necessarily such
that C′(q(θ1,θ2)) is separable in θ1 and θ2; an extremely restrictive condition which may
kill much equilibria of our common agency game. This separability is not pure luck.
Indeed, to derive interim eﬃcient allocations, Holmström and Myerson (1983) and, later
on, Ledyard and Palfrey (1999) and Laussel and Palfrey (2003) in public good contexts,
use a centralized mechanism: all information needed to decide upon the level of public
good is reported to an uninformed mediator who commits to a mechanism which speciﬁes
public good levels and compensations as functions of those reports. Under common agency
instead, allocations result froman equilibriumbetween apair of decentralized mechanisms.
As Section 7 will make clear, each principal signals his own type through the mere oﬀer
he makes to the agent whereas, at the same time, he designs his own mechanism to screen
the preferences of the other. For each piece of information, there is in a sense too much
communication and an unnecessary duplication of reports in the common agency game.
That lack of coordinated communication makes it not obvious that interim eﬃciency is
achieved in all equilibria of our game. We will be interested in a weaker statement which
is to assess whether there nevertheless exist equilibria which are indeed interim eﬃcient.













￿   θ
θi
b
−1(b(θ1) + b(θ2) − b(x))f(x)dx (30)
for all (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ2.
Finding directly the solutions (if any) to (30) is diﬃcult in general, let us ﬁrst content
ourselves with looking at linear solutions of the form b(θ) =   θ + λ(θ −   θ) and imposing
conditions on the type distribution which ensure that such a linear solution exists.





where β ≥ 0, then there exists at
least one equilibrium of the common agency game under asymmetric information which












It corresponds to social weights α(θ) = 1













(β + 1)C′(q) + 2  θ
β + 2
− θ. (33)
The case for interim eﬃciency exists under those strong assumptions on the type dis-
tribution. We see on (31) that the common agency equilibrium selected by the interim
eﬃciency criterion satisﬁes the separability property already stressed. With the gener-
alized β-distributions proposed, one equilibrium output depends linearly on the sum of
the principal’s marginal preferences for the public good whatever the cost function. This
linearity ensures separability.15
The social weights on the diﬀerent types of the principals are constant and do not
sum to one, reﬂecting the fact that the mediator proposing the centralized mechanism
implementing that interim eﬃcient allocation gives a positive weight to the agent in
his objective function. An alternative interpretation of this outcome is worth stressing.
Everything happens as if, with this centralized mechanism, the agent had now all bar-
gaining power in proposing a mechanism to the principals but would give them a weight
1
β+1 < 1 in his objective function.
Instead of working with (30), we may as well directly try to identify the Lindahl-
Samuelson conditions (26) with those conditions (29) obtained at interim eﬃcient alloca-
tions. Proceeding that way, we obtain:











< 0 holds, then there exists at least one equilibrium of the




























15Lausel and Palfrey (2003) derive also such a linear interim eﬃcient outcome in the case of a 0-1
project.
16Note that this implies that f(¯ θ) = 0.
19Propositions 5 and 6 altogether show that the common agency game may have one
equilibrium which implements what a planner having a particular speciﬁcation of the
social weights of the diﬀerent principals in his objective function would do by himself.17
Even though it is quite attractive, this result relies heavily on the distribution of types
belonging to a rather special class. When those assumptions are not satisﬁed, one needs
something else than interim eﬃciency to select among equilibria. This is the purpose of
next section.
6 Robustness to Perturbations
We follow now the so-called “Wilson doctrine” and look for an equilibrium that would
be robust to the details of the environment. More speciﬁcally, we assume that the cost
function of the agent writes as C(q) + εq for some shock ε drawn on an interval centered
around zero ] −   ε,  ε[ according to a cumulative distribution H( ) (with density h( )) that
we leave unspeciﬁed.18 Principals commit to a nonlinear schedule before the realization of
ε. This shock is observable ex post only by the agent after he has accepted the principals’
oﬀers. Since principals have to choose within a menu of nonlinear contribution schedules
which cannot be conditioned on ε, the same nonlinear contribution t(q,θi) must thus be
used for all realizations of ε.





′(q(θ1,θ2,ε)) + ε. (37)





























Proceeding as in Section 3, and focusing again on equilibria which are pointwise opti-
17This result is reminiscent of a standard result in bargaining theory stating that the optimal trad-
ing mechanism between a buyer and seller privately informed on their own valuation and cost can be
implemented as the equilibrium of a centralized mechanism (actually a double auction) when types are
uniformly distributed on the same support. See Myerson and Sattherwaite (1983).
18We do not make any further assumption on the support of this distribution. Even though, we describe
our reﬁnement in the case where principals share the same beliefs on ε, this is not needed for our argument
which extends in contexts where principals may not even share the same beliefs on ε.
20mal,19 we ﬁnd:







with the monotonicity condition
∂q
∂θi ≥ 0 for i = 1,2.
Summing (40) when i = 1 and i = 2 and using (37) and (38) yields:
2 ￿
i=1



















Had ε being identically ﬁxed at zero, the multiplicity of equilibria would come from the




∂q(q,θi). When the same marginal contribution is used for all values of the shock
ε, this ﬂexibility is pinned down by (39). The equilibrium condition (41) becomes a

















This PDE can be solved explicitly to ﬁnd the integral surfaces q = q(θ1,θ2,ε) in R4. It
is well known that every such integral surface is the union of characteristic curves obtained

















where t in R+ is an arbitrary parametrization of these characteristic curves.
The diﬀerential equation (43) can be integrated directly as
1 − F(θi(t)) = kie
−t or θi(t) = Ψ(1 − kie
−t) (46)
where Ψ = F−1 and ki’s are arbitrary positive constants. Note that one can choose k1 = 1
by rescaling parameter t.
















19Pointwise optimality should now be also meant with respect to the realization of ε also.
20See John (1982) for instance.
21where K is an arbitrary constant and t0 = max{lnk2,0} since Ψ( ) is deﬁned over [0,1].21
We are interested in deﬁning the trace of integral surfaces on the hyperplane ε = 0 to

















with θ1, θ2 and t are linked through (46).
























for θ2 ≥ θ1 (i.e., above the 45 degree line) so that k2 ≤ 1.
To better understand the structure of those solutions, let us compute their values
q(θ,θ) = Q(θ) along the ray θ1 = θ2 = θ:
C










Integrating by parts and changing variables, we ﬁnally obtain:
C
′(Q(θ)) = K
′(1 − F(θ)) + 2
￿






for some K′. Such a solution is always monotonically increasing in θ on [θ,  θ] when K′ ≤ 0.
Proposition 7 : There exists a one-dimensional set of equilibrium outputs which are ro-
bust to perturbations of the agent’s cost function. Within that set, the equilibrium outputs
on the ray θ1 = θ2 = θ can be ranked with a higher output Q0(θ) being deﬁned by (36).
Of course Q0(θ) ≤ q∗(θ,θ) because of free-riding between principals. However, there
are no distortions at both sides of the type interval, Q0(  θ) = q∗(  θ,  θ) and Q0(θ) =
q∗(θ,θ).22
21Note that for t → +∞, all solutions to (46)-(47) converge towards (¯ θ,¯ θ,2¯ θ − C′(q)).













22Interestingly, the equilibria selected through interim eﬃciency (Proposition 6) and the
Pareto-dominating one which is robust to perturbations are identical on the 45 degree line.
Tedious computations show nevertheless that the two equilibria diﬀer oﬀ the diagonal. In
that case, interim eﬃciency and robustness to perturbations may conﬂict oﬀ the diagonal.
Remark 6: Importantly, our selection device yields an allocation q0(θ1,θ2) which can be
computed for any distributions F( ) whereas interim eﬃciency is explicitly obtained only
with restrictive assumptions on those distributions. Our selection device is thus applicable
in a broader range of environments.
Remark 7: It is worth mentioning that perturbations could come from the presence of
an extra principal whose preferences for the public good ǫq are observable only by the
agent.
Remark 8: Think about an econometrician having observed data (marginal contributions
and outputs), aware of the structure of the game and willing to estimate which equilibrium
is played among those presented in Section 4. This econometrician would like to introduce
some random shock exactly as we did above and would certainly estimate the robust
equilibrium allocation.
The special case of a 0-1 project: As an application, consider the special case of
a 0-1 project whose unit cost is c as in Laussel and Palfrey (2003). We assume that
the principals’ valuations are drawn in [0,1] and that c < 2 so that, under complete
information, it would be optimal to make the project if and only if both principals have a
suﬃciently high valuation, namely θ1 + θ2 ≥ c. The quantity q is now interpreted as the
probability of building the project.
Using (36), the boundary of the area where the project is done is deﬁned implicitly
above the bissectrice θ1 = θ2 by the curve:
















for θ2 ≥ θ1 and a symmetric expression for θ2 ≤ θ1.
It is easy to check that the line which separates the areas where the project is either
done or not crosses the horizontal axes θ2 = 1 for θ
∗
1 which solves:









For a uniform distribution, we ﬁnd
c = 2θ
∗ + (1 − θ
∗)ln(1 − θ
∗)
and thus 1 > θ
∗ > c
2 necessarily.
22Consistently with Proposition 7, we select K′ = 0.
237 Mechanism Design Approach
In this section, we propose an alternative approach to characterize the pointwise optimal
equilibria of the common agency game using mechanism design techniques. This alterna-
tive approach illustrates the role of the nonlinear contribution of any given principal in
simultaneously screening the other principal’s type and signaling his own to the agent.
Viewing the strategy of each principal as a choice within a menu {t(q,ˆ θi)}ˆ θi∈Θ as we
did so far and writing down the condition for incentive compatibility may a priory entails
a loss of generality if we want to describe the whole set of equilibria when principals are
unrestricted in the mechanisms they may oﬀer. Indeed, a given principal might like to
deviate to a more complex mechanism than a nonlinear contribution schedule. In this
section, we show that this is indeed not the case. We will describe explicitly Pi’s best-
response to P−i’s own oﬀer within the largest class of mechanisms available and show that
it can actually be implemented as a contribution schedule.
For any ﬁxed nonlinear schedule oﬀered by principal Pi, the design of P−i’s own con-
tribution is an informed principal problem under private values. We know from Maskin
and Tirole (1990) that, under risk-neutrality, there is no loss of generality in having prin-
cipal P−i oﬀering a contract to the agent exactly as if the latter was informed on the
principal’s type. Intuitively, the mechanism consisting in piling up the various contracts
that would be signed by those diﬀerent types if the agent was informed on P−i’s pref-
erences is incentive compatible from the principal’s point of view and achieves a lower
bound on the principal’s payoﬀs. The key insight due to Maskin and Tirole (1990) is
that, higher payoﬀs can only be achieved if the principal is risk-averse. This is obtained
by pooling those contracts at the time of oﬀering contracts and revealing the principal’s
type at a later communication stage only. Pooling oﬀers relaxes the agent’s incentive and
participation constraints and improves risk-sharing among the diﬀerent types of the prin-
cipal. With risk-neutrality, this insurance motive disappears and the lowest bound on the
principal’s payoﬀ is also an upper bound. In that case, instead of oﬀering a mechanism
to the agent with a communication stage after contract’s acceptance, the principal is as
well oﬀ revealing his type right away by oﬀering only one contract. For each contribution
oﬀered by Pi, P−i has thus always in his best-response correspondence a separating menu
of contributions.23
In the single principal environment of Maskin and Tirole (1990), this equivalence
23The reader will recognize here a feature already found in Bernheim and Whinston (1986a)’s original
paper. To reﬁne with a truthfulness criterion among all equilibria of their common agency game under
complete information, they indeed ﬁrst notice that each principal has a best response which is truthful
and thus justify that focusing at equilibria in truthful schedules is meaningful. We apply the same device
to justify that focusing on equilibria where principals reveal their types through a separating oﬀer is also
meaningful.
24between two contracting modes has no consequence. In our common agency environment
instead, that seemingly innocuous diﬀerence in the timing of information revelation has
a strategic value since it aﬀects the way principal Pi will himself contract with the agent.
Provided that P−i’s oﬀer reveals his type to the agent, Pi knows that he should design
his contribution not only to signal his own type to the agent but also to screen P−i’s type
which is “endogenously” learned in equilibrium by the agent. This points at the major
role that nonlinear contributions play in a common agency environment: learning over
what Epstein and Peters (1999) and Peters (2001) would call market information; i.e.,
everything which is not known to a given principal and, most speciﬁcally in our context,
the preferences of others.
We focus on pure strategy PBE with separating menus which reveal all information
to the agent through contract oﬀers. To compute Pi’s best response to any given P−i’s
nonlinear contribution t−i(q,θ−i) within the largest space of possible mechanisms, we use
the Revelation Principle.24 We may thus as well restrict the analysis to direct truthful
revelation mechanisms {tD
i (ˆ θ−i|θi),q(ˆ θ−i|θi)} where ˆ θ−i is the agent’s report on θ−i (that
he has learned through the revelation induced by P−i’s oﬀer). We will compute these
direct revelation mechanisms as if θi was known by the agent. Again, this is justiﬁed by
our discussion above and the result of Maskin and Tirole (1990). The agent’s utility can
then be written as:
ˆ U(ˆ θ−i,θ−i|θi) = t
D
i (ˆ θ−i|θi) + t−i(q(ˆ θ−i|θi),θ−i) − C(q(ˆ θ−i|θi)). (49)
From incentive compatibility we get:
U(θ−i|θi) = ˆ U(θ−i,θ−i|θi) = max
ˆ θ−i
ˆ U(ˆ θ−i,θ−i|θi).
We assume that t−i(q,θ−i) is twice diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes SMP. Using standard
techniques, we get:
• q(θ−i|θi) is monotonically increasing and thus almost everywhere diﬀerentiable with
respect to θ−i with,
∂q
∂θ−i
(θ−i|θi) ≥ 0 a.e., (50)







24See Martimort and Stole (2002, 2003) for this way of applying the Revelation Principle to compute
best response of pure strategy equilibria in common agency games.
25At a best-response to t−i(q,θ−i), Pi with type θi must solve the following problem:
(Pi) : max
{U( |θi);q( |θi)}
E [θiq( |θi) + t−i(q( |θi), ) − C(q( |θi)) − U( |θi)], (52)
subject to (50)-(51) and
U(θ−i|θi) ≥ 0, for all θ−i ∈ Θ. (53)
where (53) is the agent’s ex post participation which guarantees that he makes a positive
proﬁt for all preference proﬁles (θi,θ−i).
A solution to (Pi) is an allocation {U(θ−i|θi),q(θ−i|θi} or equivalently a direct rev-
elation mechanism {tD
i (θ−i|θi),q(θ−i|θi)} (we omit the dependence on t−i(q,θ−i)) from
which we can reconstruct a nonlinear contribution ti(q,θi) when q(θ−i|θi) is invertible.
Of course, since all problems (Pi) have the same constrained set whatever θi, the menu
{ti(q|ˆ θi)}ˆ θi∈Θ obtained is incentive compatible from principal Pi’s point of view.
Proposition 8 : Provided that (50) holds, an equilibrium with separating contributions
satisﬁes (8) and (9) and is thus pointwise optimal.
Comparing with the more direct approach taken in Proposition 1, we observe that the
equilibria with separating contributions describe indeed the pointwise optimal allocations
that we selected in Section 3. By the same token, it is easy to see that the equilibria
satisfying the weaker condition (6) correspond in fact to cases where a subset S of the
principals P−i pool and oﬀer the whole set of contributions {t−i(q,θ−i)}θ−i∈S. Following
these pooling oﬀers, the agent learns nothing on principal P−i when his type lies in set S
and Pi cannot learn these types through screening.
Proposition 8 shows thus that the focus on pointwise optimal allocations is a rather
natural requirement. It comes immediately from the fact that each principal may as well
reveal truthfully his type to the agent through his mere oﬀer of a contract at a best
response.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed a common agency game privately informed principals with,
in mind, the objectives of checking whether the earlier lessons of common agency games
under complete information are in fact robust and of extending their insights. In that
respect, our results leave us with contrasted feelings. Under asymmetric information,
incentive compatibility conditions on the principals replace the “truthfulness” requirement
used in the earlier literature but far from helping in selecting an equilibrium allocation, it
26still generates a multiplicity of outcomes. “Almost anything” is an equilibrium allocation
provided that this allocation leads to under-provision of the public good below the ﬁrst-
best. Free-riding and ex post ineﬃciency are thus pervasive in common agency games
under asymmetric information.
Nevertheless, a few more optimistic insights emerge from our analysis. First, we have
been able to specify conditions under which equilibria of the common agency game yield
interim eﬃcient allocations. This suggests that modelers could sometimes forget about
the complexity of the decentralized approach and instead look at a centralized mechanism
design approach provided that the social weights on the diﬀerent types of principals are
conveniently speciﬁed. Extending the conditions under which that decentralization result
obtains seems a fruitful alley for research. Second, if one is not particularly comfortable
with an eﬃciency criterion, one may prefer to select among all equilibrium allocations
those which are robust to random perturbations of the game. Such allocations exist and
can be characterized. Finally, the class of pointwise optimal equilibria of common agency
games under asymmetric information can be easily analyzed with standard mechanism
design techniques and is robust in the sense that a principal would not like to deviate to
a larger space of mechanisms to improve his payoﬀ.
Our model should certainly be extended along several directions. First, we should
analyze also delegated common agency games. Taking a mechanism design approach in
computing best-responses, this possibility introduces a type-dependent participation con-
straint which aﬀects the distribution of surplus between principals. An open question
is whether it also aﬀects the equilibrium allocations. Second, other information struc-
tures could possibly be analyzed. One may think the case of correlation between the
principals’ types and of the case where the agent has also some private information on
his own. Third, following Maskin and Tirole (1990), we know that risk-aversion on the
principals’ side forces pooling in informed principal games. This may signiﬁcantly change
equilibrium patterns in common agency environments. Fourth, the robust equilibrium we
have selected could be amenable to econometric analysis.25 Lastly, in other institutional
contexts, allocations do not result from a well-centralized mechanisms but come out of the
equilibria among various decentralized mechanisms. One may think of multi-unit auctions
on ﬁnancial or electricity markets for instance. It would be nice to extend the approach
taken in this paper to these environments. We hope to investigate some of these issues in
future research.
25This could be useful in view of the recent vintage of empirical works having taken the Grossman and
Helpman (1994) political economy model to estimate policy distortions. See Gawande and Bandyopad-
hyay (2000) for instance.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let us ﬁx (θi,θ−i) and consider θi > θ
′
i. By deﬁnition, we have
t(q(θi,θ−i),θi) + t(q(θi,θ−i),θ−i) − c(q(θi,θ−i)) ≥ t(˜ q,θi) + t(˜ q,θ−i) − c(˜ q), ∀˜ q.
Thus,
t(q(θi,θ−i),θi) − t(˜ q,θi) ≥ t(˜ q,θ−i) − c(˜ q) − [t(q(θi,θ−i),θ−i) − c(q(θi,θ−i))]
for all ˜ q ≤ q(θi,θ−i).
Using (SMP), the l.h.s. above is lower than t(q(θi,θ−i),θ
′
i) − t(˜ q,θ
′
i) for all ˜ q ≤
q(θi,θ−i). Then q(θi,θ−i) ≥ q(θ
′
i,θ−i) and q( ) is almost everywhere diﬀerentiable in
each of its arguments.
Proof of Proposition 1: Using (5), we get the following ﬁrst-order derivative of Φ( )
with respect to ˆ θi:
∂Φ
∂ˆ θi
(ˆ θi,θi) = E
￿￿
θi −




′′(q(ˆ θi, )) −
∂p
∂q











1 − F( )
f( )
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(q(ˆ θi,θ),ˆ θi). (A1)
Integrating by parts the second term yields
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￿
1 − F( )
f( )
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′′(q(ˆ θi, )) −
∂p
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′(q(ˆ θi, )) − p(q(ˆ θi, ), )
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′′(q(ˆ θi, )) −
∂p
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′(q(ˆ θi, )) − p(q(ˆ θi, ), )
￿
. (A2)
where the last equality comes from (2) for θ1 = ˆ θi and θ2 = θ.
Moreover, it must be that the agent’s payoﬀ with type ˆ θi when θ−i = θ is zero
t(q(ˆ θi,θ),ˆ θi) + t(q(ˆ θi,θ),θ) = C(q(ˆ θi,θ)), for all ˆ θi. (A3)
Diﬀerentiating w.r.t. ˆ θi yields:
￿







(q(ˆ θi,θ),ˆ θi) = 0
and thus using (2),
∂t
∂θi
(q(ˆ θi,θ),ˆ θi) = 0 for all ˆ θi. (A4)
Inserting into (A1) yields:
∂Φ
∂ˆ θi






θi + p(q(ˆ θi, ), ) − C
′(q(ˆ θi, )) −








For ˆ θi = θi being the optimal report, i.e., ∂Φ
∂ˆ θi(θi,θi) = 0, we obtain the ﬁrst-order
condition (6).






￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
ˆ θi=θi
≤ 0.
But using (A5) and the envelope theorem and taking the total derivative of (A4) with













Proof of Lemma 2: The proof of this lemma reduces to show that the schedule satisfying
(8) and (9) is not only locally incentive compatible but also globally. From (A5) and (9)
we have that



























By (9) this last expression is always non-negative.
Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 : Fix ψ(q,θ) and ˜ θ in [θ,  θ] such that ψ(q,˜ θ) = ˜ θ and





(q,θ) = ψ(q,θ) − p(ψ(q,θ)). (A6)
Using (18), we get (23). Still using (18) at θ = ˜ θ, we obtain the initial condition (20).
Consider (23) and note that it can be rewritten as:
∂
∂θ
[(1 − F(θ))p(q,θ)] = (ψ(q,θ) − C
′(q))f(θ).
Integrating yields





But using (20), we get k = −
C′(q)














We must check that
∂p
∂θ(q,θ) > 0 over [θ,˜ θ] to have a SMP equilibrium. Then, because
∂ψ










also on [˜ θ,  θ], by (23).
To guarantee
∂p
∂θ(q,θ) > 0 on [θ,˜ θ], from (18) and (19) we must have
ψ(q,θ) + p(q,θ) − C
′(q) > 0
on [θ,˜ θ].
Using (A7), this amounts to proving that
B(θ) = 2(1 − F(θ))ψ(q,θ) + 2
￿ θ
˜ θ
ψ(q,x)f(x)dx − (1 − F(˜ θ))C
′(q)
is positive over [θ,˜ θ].
32Note that
˙ B(θ) = 2
∂ψ
∂θ
(q,θ)(1 − F(θ)) ≤ 0
so that B(θ) is decreasing over [θ,˜ θ] and thus minimized at ˜ θ for B(˜ θ) = (1−F(˜ θ))(2˜ θ −
C′(q)) > 0. Hence,
∂p
∂θ(q,θ) > 0 over [θ,˜ θ].
From that, we immediately obtain that ψ(q,θ) ≥ p(q,ψ(q,θ)) on [θ,˜ θ] and by diﬀer-
entiating (19) that
∂p
∂θ(q,θ) > 0 also on [˜ θ,  θ] which implies that p(θ) ≤ θ on [θ,˜ θ] also.
Proof of Corollary 2: From Corollary 1, we know that C′(q(θ1,θ2)) ≤ θ1+θ2, moreover,
from construction in Proposition 3, we have
∂q
∂θi > 0. Hence the result follows.















which admits the (unique) solution b( ) deﬁned by
b(θ) = 2θ −
1
1 − F(θ)
￿   θ
θ
xf(x)dx = θ −
1
1 − F(θ)
￿   θ
θ
(1 − F(x))dx.












which ﬁnally yields (31).
From this, we also get
1 − ˜ α(θ) =
f(θ)
(1 − F(θ))2
￿   θ
θ
(1 − F(x))dx
and ￿   θ
θ
α(x)f(x)dx = 1 − F(θ) −
f(θ)
1 − F(θ)
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￿￿   θ
θ
(1 − F(x))dx
33and ﬁnally α(θ) = 1
β+1 for all θ in [θ,  θ]. Finally, ψ(q,θ) is directly obtained from (31)
and p(q,θ) is derived from (12).
Proof of Proposition 6: We can identity conditions (26) and (29) by setting






















1 − ˜ α(θ1)
1 − ˜ α(ψ(q,θ1))
. (A8)












Identifying (A8) and (A9), one possibility is to set ˙ b(θ) = 1−˜ α(θ). Inserting this expression
in the deﬁnition of b( ) yields the diﬀerential equation:




with the boundary condition b(  θ) =   θ.
Solving (A10) gives
b






with k ≤ 0 to insure that ˙ bIE(θ) > 0 everywhere on [θ,  θ]. For k = 0, we get the less
distorted outcome in the ex post sense.
We have also












One can show that A(θ) remains increasing as long as A(θ) < 1. Hence, under the
assumption of the proposition, ˜ α(θ) remains positive.
Moreover, by diﬀerentiating in θ, we have:













34When the monotone hazard rate property holds, we have:




α(θ) ≥ 2(1 − A(θ)) > 0
ensuring that all social weights are positive.
Derivation of (40): Observe that now:
Φ(ˆ θi,θi) = E[θiq(ˆ θi, ) − t(q(ˆ θi, ),ˆ θi)]
where q(ˆ θi, ) is meant for q(ˆ θi,θi,ε) and E[ ] denotes now the expectation operator with
respect to the joint distribution of θ−i and ε which has density f(θ−i)h(ε).
Proceeding as in the main text, we get again:
Φ(ˆ θi,θi) = E
￿￿
θiq(ˆ θi, ) −










−Eε[t(q(ˆ θi,θ,ε),ˆ θi)], (A12)
where Eε[ ] denotes now the expectation operator with respect to the distribution of ε.
The proof then is similar to that of Proposition 1 once we replace (A3) by the participation
constraint in expectation over ε since the agent accepts the contracts before the realization
of ε:
Eε[t(q(ˆ θi,θ,ε),ˆ θi) + t(q(ˆ θi,θ,ε),θ) − C(q(ˆ θi,θ,ε))] = 0, for all ˆ θi. (A13)
The optimality condition ∂Φ





(θi,θi) ≤ 0 can be handled as in the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 8: For equilibria where
∂t−i
∂θ−i(q,θ−i) ≥ 0, U(θ−i|θi) is increasing
and (51) is binding at θ−i = θ. Integrating by parts, we obtain:
E [U( |θi)] = E
￿







Inserting into (52) and optimizing with respect to q(θ−i|θi) yields (8).
Provided that
∂q
∂θ−i(θ−i|θi) ≥ 0, this gives the pointwise optimal output.
Non-Diﬀerentiable Equilibria: For the sake of completeness, we present in this section
a class of non-diﬀerentiable equilibria. To analyze those equilibria, it turns out that the
most useful procedure is based on the supply proﬁle due to Wilson (1993).26
26Wilson (1993) is interested in nonlinear pricing and thus consider in fact demande proﬁles.
35Consider a principal Pi with type θi willing to pay a marginal contribution pi for q
units of the public good. This principal has to evaluate the measure of types of principal
P−i who are also willing to contribute enough so that this amount is produced.




p−i(q,˜ θ−i) + pi ≥ C
′(q)
￿
= 1 − G−i(C
′(q) − pi|q)
where G−i( |q) is the cumulative distribution of the marginal contribution of principal
P−i for q units of the public good. Given that residual supply schedule, Pi acts in fact




(θi − pi)(1 − G−i(C
′(q) − pi|q)).
These best responses for each θi induce a distribution of marginal contributions Gi( |q)
for principal Pi. A symmetric equilibrium of the common agency game is thus a family
of distributions (one for each value of q) G( |q) which are ﬁxed-points of these processes.
To ﬁnd an interesting class of non-diﬀerentiable equilibria, it is in fact enough to
specify marginal contributions having two steps and a threshold θ
∗(q) such that:
• for θ ≥ θ
∗(q), p(q,θ) =   p(q);
• for θ ≤ θ
∗(q), p(q,θ) = p(q) (<   p(q)).
As we will see below, the three functions   p( ), p( ) and θ
∗( ) are linked altogether
by some equilibrium conditions. Given a function θ
∗(q) (satisfying some properties to
be made precise below), one can certainly ﬁnd a two-step equilibrium (or the marginal
contribution associated to it) using those conditions.
For a two-step symmetric equilibrium, let us describe the probability that q units of
the public good are produced given a marginal contribution pi:
G(C
′(q) − pi|q) = 0 if pi > C
′(q) − p(q)
G(C
′(q) − pi|q) = F(θ
∗(q)) if C
′(q) −   p(q) ≤ pi ≤ C
′(q) − p(q)
G(C
′(q) − pi|q) = 1 if pi ≤ C
′(q) −   p(q)
where in ﬁrst (last) case q units of the public good are (never) produced and the second
case there is a probability 1 − F(θ
∗(q)) to be produced.
For each quantity q and θi a type for Pi, Pi’s best response is to oﬀer a marginal
contribution   p(q) = C′(q) − p(q) whenever
θi − C
′(q) + p(q) ≥ max
C′(q)−  p(q)≤pi≤C′(q)−p(q)
(θi − pi)(1 − F(θ
∗(q))) (A14)
36= (θi − C
′(q) +   p(q))(1 − F(θ
∗(q))).
The set of such types θi is thus of the form [θ
∗(q),  θ] as requested by the structure postu-
lated for the equilibrium.
At a symmetric two-step equilibrium, it must thus be that the two following conditions
hold:




∗(q) solves (A14) as an equality, i.e., (A16)
θ
∗(q)F(θ




For q such that
C′(q)
2 ≤   p(q) ≤   θ, (A17) deﬁnes uniquely θ
∗(q) in [θ,  θ]. Alternatively,
given an increasing schedule Q∗(θ) which admits an inverse θ
∗(q) which is almost every-
where diﬀerentiable, one can reconstruct   p(q) from (A17) and p(q) from (A15). Note that
  p(q) is such that   p(q) ≥
C′(q)
2 .
Proposition 9 : There exists multiplicity of equilibria with two-steps marginal contribu-
tions. For each Q∗(θ) monotonically increasing with Q∗(  θ) = q∗(  θ,  θ) and Q∗(θ) ≤ q∗(θ,θ),
there exists an equilibrium described by (A15) and (A17).
Proof: The only thing to note is that for θ1 < θ
∗(q) ≤ θ2, P2 oﬀers a marginal contribu-
tion   p(q) whereas P1 oﬀers p(q), leading to the choice of q units. Idem for θ2 ≤ θ
∗(q) < θ1
with the identity of the principals being reversed. When θ1 = θ2 = θ
∗(q), note that
both principals are indiﬀerent between paying   p(q) or p(q) at the margin. Break this
indiﬀerence with a lexicographic order in favor of principal P1 who pays indeed p(q) when
both contributions are the same. Then the isoquant for q units cuts the diagonal at
θ1 = θ2 = θ
∗(q). Note that (A17) and   p(q) ≥
C′(q)
2 imply that 2θ
∗(q) ≥ C′(q).
It is worth describing the isoquants corresponding to those non-diﬀerentiable equilib-
ria. In fact, those curves are the reunion made of the horizontal segment {θ1 ≥ θ
∗(q)}
with the vertical segment {θ2 ≥ θ
∗(q)}. Those non-diﬀerentiable equilibria allows us to
describe settings where isoquants are not strictly decreasing (ψ(q, ) being not invertible).
Remark 9: Equilibria with more than two steps can also be constructed following the
same kind of procedure.
Remark 10: Those non-diﬀerentiable equilibria are clearly not robust to the introduction
of perturbations.
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